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CHILDREN AND WELL-BEING
Anthony Skelton
Introduction
Children are routinely treated paternalistically. There are reasons for this (see ch. 11). Children 
are quite vulnerable (see ch. 27). They are ill-equipped to meet their most basic needs, due, in 
part, to deficiencies in practical and theoretical reasoning and in executing their wishes. Chil-
dren’s motivations and perceptions are often not congruent with their best interests. Conse-
quently, raising children involves facilitating their best interests synchronically and diachronically. 
In practice, this requires caregivers to (in some sense) manage a child’s daily life. If apposite, this 
management will focus partly on a child’s well-being. To be ably executed, an account of chil-
dren’s well-being will need to be articulated.
This chapter focuses on the nature of children’s well-being. It has five sections. The first 
section clarifies the focus. The second section examines some hurdles to articulating a view of 
children’s well-being. The third section evaluates some accounts of children’s well-being. The 
fourth section addresses the view that children possess features essential to them that make their 
lives on balance prudentially bad for them. The fifth section sums things up.
Preliminaries
It is important to begin by fixing ideas. Thinking about children’s well-being involves thinking 
about what is prudentially good for children. An account of well-being’s nature in children 
outlines what is fundamentally, non-instrumentally good for a child, and therefore tells us how 
well a child’s life or part of a child’s life is going for her. This is distinct from thinking about the 
causes or goods instrumental to well-being’s production.
Thinking about prudential value is distinct from thinking about whether childhood itself is 
non-instrumentally good (see ch. 27).1 Thinking about the latter involves thinking about what 
value to place on a period in life. This usually takes the form of wondering whether, of the stages 
in life (e.g., adulthood and senescence), childhood has unique or special value. Thinking about 
children’s well-being may help in thinking about the value of childhood, but thinking about the 
former is a distinct preoccupation. It involves thinking of the value one’s life or part of one’s life 
has from one’s own perspective. It is, anyway, doubtful that childhood in itself is valuable. It is 
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Children and well-being
likely that the value of childhood, if it has value, is a function of the things of value possessed in 
it. The prudential value of a child’s life is likely one such thing.
Thinking about prudential value is distinct from thinking about what makes a child’s life 
good tout court. Prudential value contributes to living a good life. But other things might, too.2 
These might be the appropriate focus of those properly managing a child’s life. Developing 
some virtues – dedication to the common weal – might contribute to the value of a child’s life 
without making her prudentially better off. Ditto the experience of certain other, perfectionist 
goods, e.g., the contemplation of beauty.
Thinking about prudential value is different from thinking about the so-called “intrinsic 
goods of childhood”, that is, “goods the value of which doesn’t follow from their contribution 
to the goods of adult life” (Brennan 2014: 35; see also ch. 7). It is possible to establish that there 
are such goods without establishing that any of them are non-instrumentally prudentially good 
for a child. It seems that some things are non-instrumentally good for children, e.g., happiness, 
irrespective of the contribution they make to adult life. Theories of well-being seek to make 
sense of how and why claims such as this are true.
Hurdles
In thinking about the nature of children’s well-being one has to be mindful of the fact that 
children develop during childhood. An infant shares little in common with a seven- or eight-
year-old and has even less in common with an eleven- or twelve-year-old. The nature of 
consciousness, agency, expression, cognition, and the comprehension and manipulation of infor-
mation changes quite radically in childhood. This is on top of profound changes in children’s 
physical features and abilities. It is, of course, important not to overstate the point. There is some 
uniformity amongst children and especially younger children; they are, e.g., not fully formed 
agents. Nevertheless, that children typically change significantly in childhood makes developing 
a comprehensive and fully general view of children’s well-being difficult. Perhaps the best strat-
egy is to say what appears true generally about children’s well-being, making amendments to the 
view as differences between the stages of childhood are noted. This will no doubt involve taking 
seriously that there are some differences in the nature of well-being (and certainly its causes) for 
infants, young children, and older children.
It is also important to note that developmental (and other) facts about children make it dif-
ficult in thinking about children’s well-being to draw on accounts of well-being that are adult 
focused. This is true whether the focus is on fully formed rational adults or deviations from that 
(typical) focus. Seeing this involves considering that there are distinct accounts of well-being for 
children and for adults (Skelton 2015, 2016).
In developing an account of children’s well-being, one is confronted by another difficulty: 
the individuals from whom moral philosophers often seek guidance – Aristotle, Kant, and the 
classical utilitarians Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick – have little specific to say about children’s 
well-being. 
Aristotle maintains that children cannot fare well. He remarks that 
it is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of the animals happy; 
for none of them is capable of sharing in…[virtuous] activity. For this reason also a boy 
is not happy; for he is not yet capable of such acts, owing to his age; and boys who are 
called happy are being congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for them. 
(Aristotle 1999: 1099b33–1100a3)
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Aristotle’s argument is as follows: well-being consists in activity in accordance with intellectual 
and moral excellences. Children are incapable of activity in accordance with intellectual and 
moral excellences. Children thus cannot fare well; in describing them as faring well we are con-
gratulating them on having what we believe are rosy prospects.
The best reply to this argument is to reject its implicit assumption: that there is only one way 
to fare well. It is possible that at least at some point during childhood children fare well in a way 
that is different to adults. In this case, what follows from Aristotle’s premises is that children do 
not fare well as adults do. It does not follow that they do not fare well. 
One might also attack the conclusion of Aristotle’s argument. It is false to the facts. First, it is 
unclear when we hope that our child fares well that we are hoping to have high hopes for our 
child. Second, it is not the case that when we describe a child as faring poorly that this is due 
entirely to the fact that we think she has poor prospects in the future. We might believe that a 
child’s life is going poorly for her now due to an illness while believing that she has a very rosy 
future upon recovery.
If one desires to work out a view of children’s well-being, one cannot gain much from 
Aristotle. Contemporary proponents of Aristotelian views have not, for the most part, it seems, 
improved in this regard.3 Neera Badhwar, for example, argues that well-being consists in happi-
ness in a worthwhile life. Her view of happiness appears not to fit children. According to her, “a 
happy person…[is] a person who finds his life both meaningful and enjoyable” (Badhwar 2014: 
35; italics added). A child might find their life enjoyable. But children lack the concept of mean-
ingfulness; therefore, they cannot find that their life falls into this category.4 Badhwar’s view of a 
worthwhile life comprises being reality oriented, having an understanding of oneself and gen-
eral facts about the world and others, and being autonomous, thinking and living independently, 
and these in turn involve the possession of certain virtues or excellences of character, including 
fairness, open-mindedness, and honesty (Badhwar 2014: 44ff., 108). If this is what well-being 
consists in, children cannot fare well.
Kant is more helpful than Aristotle. At various points in his corpus he develops views of 
well-being applicable to children. He writes in terms of happiness; he is, however, interested 
in well-being. In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant contends that well-being 
consists in “the satisfaction of all inclinations as a sum” (Kant 2002: 4:399, also 4:405, 4:418). 
This suggests that well-being consists in the satisfaction of desire. This is an implausible view 
of children’s well-being. Its main defect is that the depth and breadth of the desires that may 
legitimately be attributed to children are too few to capture all that matters to their well-being 
(Skelton 2015, 2016; also, Lin 2017: 9ff.)
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant suggests that well-being consists in “a rational being’s 
consciousness of the agreeableness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence” 
(Kant 1997: 5:22). This appears to be a form of well-being hedonism: one is faring well when 
one feels on balance more pleasure than pain. This is not a view of well-being that fits the vast 
majority of children; they may not qualify as fully rational beings in Kant’s sense (Schapiro 
1999), and it is unclear that they are capable of “consciousness” of the sort called for in it.
In most cases in which he discusses well-being, Kant has rational agents in mind. However, 
he commits himself to a view of children’s well-being in the Metaphysics of Morals. At least with 
respect to school children, he holds that well-being consists in everything always going “the 
way you would like it to”, which he treats as equivalent to the claim that well-being consists in 
“enjoyment of life, complete satisfaction with one’s condition” (Kant 1996: 6:480; see also Kant 
2002: 4:393, 4:369, for a similar view). 
This position, too, appears to be a brand of hedonism. In thinking that children’s well-being 
consists in surplus pleasure or enjoyment or felt satisfaction, Kant is joined, of course, by the 
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classical utilitarians who hold, on one interpretation, hedonism about well-being, the view that 
all and only pleasure is non-instrumentally good for one, and that all and only pain is non- 
instrumentally bad for one (see, e.g., Sidgwick 1907). 
Might hedonism be the correct account of children’s well-being? Some contemporary the-
orists who do not defend hedonism in general certainly seem to think so (e.g., Sumner 1996; 
Macleod 2010; for discussion, see Skelton 2015, 2016, forthcoming).
Before going on, it is important to report that Kant’s contemporary admirers have not dis-
cussed his views on children’s well-being. In the most sustained discussion of Kant on children, 
Tamar Schapiro does not touch on the topic in her argument that childhood is a “normative 
predicament” (Schapiro 1999: 730). She outlines some obligations that adults have to children, 
but none of them relates to children’s well-being (1999: 734ff.). This might be because her focus 
is on the acquisition in children of a will. But it is strange nonetheless. The issue is no doubt 
quite complicated for Kantians: it is unclear that all children are worthy of happiness as one must 
be, for Kant, to legitimately possess it, since they are underdeveloped and so lack the character-
istics making them worthy of happiness (Kant 2002: 4:393; cf. Kant 1996: 6:481).
Let us turn now to the question of hedonism’s plausibility as a conception of children’s 
well-being. Hedonism’s popularity is rising (for defenses, see Crisp 2006; Hewitt 2010; Bramble 
2016). It has a number of attractions. Pleasure seems to matter to well-being, especially when 
the conception of it is broad enough to capture all of the affective states mattering to it. Hedon-
ism can explain a great deal about what seemingly matters to children’s well-being, e.g., play, 
friendship, sport, and so on. It injects system into our thinking about prudential value; pleasure 
may be used to explain, justify, and reconcile conflicts between other putative prudential values 
(Sidgwick 1907). Hedonism applies to the broad range of subjects to whom welfare judgments 
are applied, e.g., animals, neonates, children, and adults. For some, this generality is an attractive 
feature in a theory of well-being (Sumner 1996). Finally, it captures the popular idea that only 
that which affects one’s experience positively is capable of making one better off (i.e., an expe-
rience requirement).5
Hedonism has been attacked on the grounds that things other than what affects one’s expe-
rience of one’s life matter to well-being (Nozick 1974; Sumner 1996; Badhwar 2014). The main 
worry is that one might have a large surplus of pleasure because one believes that one has loving 
friends, esteem from one’s co-workers, and a loving family when, in fact, (unbeknownst to one) 
one’s beliefs are false and one’s friends, family, and co-workers have no such attitudes. Hedonism 
has to claim that one’s life is going quite well. But many hold that the fact that one’s beliefs are 
false, and that one does not possess certain goods in question, makes a non-instrumental dif-
ference to how well one’s life is going. The intuition is that one’s life would be better were the 
beliefs in question true and one possessed the goods. Many infer from this that it is more than 
pleasure that matters to well-being. Real friendships, esteem, familial love, and so on, matter, too.
Some have tried to impugn the intuition that things other than pleasure matter to well- 
being (e.g., contact with reality). One line of attack is to argue that such intuitions are a result of 
evolutionary and/or social and/or psychological forces rather than accurate perceptions of the 
way things are, prudentially speaking. In this case, the intuitions have their source in mechanisms 
that do not preserve truth (e.g., reproductive advantage or social approval) and so are unjustified 
(Hewitt 2010: 345–346). Hedonists have further argued that they can explain that we have the 
intuitions in order to solve the paradox of happiness. The most efficient pursuit of happiness 
involves pursuing it indirectly by pursuing directly putative goods such as the ones above under 
the belief that they are, in fact, non-instrumentally good for one (Hewitt 2010: 346ff.). 
Not everyone is convinced. Some wonder whether the intuitions that support hedonism are 
themselves subject to debunking arguments (Skelton 2015). Some take a dim view of system; 
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hedonism is not clearly better than its rivals, for comparing pleasures is difficult. Others might 
see little attraction in generality or find it attractive only if the view that is general is compelling 
(for discussion, see Skelton 2015). Some reject the experience requirement (Hooker 2015).
A detailed discussion of the merits of hedonism is not possible here. A plausible way to assess 
it is to present rivals. This is the burden of the next section. In the meantime, it is worth noting 
that one’s departure from hedonism will likely depend on one’s faith in the intuitions conflicting 
with it and one’s tolerance for some (greater) philosophical disorder.
Children’s well-being
The literature on the nature of children’s well-being is in its infancy.6 In what exists, it is agreed 
that children’s well-being comprises an objective component.7 How well a child’s life is going 
for her depends on more than what resonates with her. It is hard to know exactly what accounts 
for this. One reason is that a child’s point of view is too immature to furnish an inventory of 
subjective attitudes robust enough to support a fully subjective theory of children’s well-being. 
The main contenders in the literature are objective-list views (Brennan 2014; Brighouse and 
Swift 2014; Wendler 2010) and hybrid views (Kraut 2007; Skelton 2015, forthcoming).
Samantha Brennan argues that children’s well-being consists in the possession of the goods of 
unstructured imaginative play, relationships with other children and with adults, opportunities to 
meaningfully contribute to household and community, time spent outdoors and in the natural 
world, physical affection, physical activity and sport, bodily pleasure, music and art, emotional 
well-being, and physical well-being and health (Brennan 2014: 42).
Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift maintain there are five interests, the satisfaction of which are 
non-instrumentally good for children: physical interests or having one’s physical needs met, e.g., 
“health care, nutrition, shelter”, and the like (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 64); cognitive interests, 
comprising an interest in acquiring reflective capacities sufficient for autonomy; emotional interests, 
including an interest in regulating one’s emotions and in connecting emotionally with others; moral 
interests, including an interest in understanding and adapting one’s behavior to “the basic demands 
of morality” (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 64); and an interest in enjoying childhood, including pos-
sessing the goods of “innocence of sexuality” and “being carefree” (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 65).
David Wendler contends that there are four interests, the satisfaction of which are non- 
instrumentally good for children (Wendler 2010: 136): biological interests, e.g., “food and 
water, appropriate ambient temperature, and sufficient sleep” (Wendler 2010: 130); experiential 
interests, e.g., feeling contented and avoiding suffering; interests in meaningful relationships, 
including with people, with animals, with projects, and so on; and personal interests, including 
“preferences, desires, hopes, dreams, projects, and goals” (Wendler 2010: 131).
Such views face a shared difficulty.8 Each view claims that something can be good for a child 
even if he or she is indifferent to or has an aversion to it. It is, for example, the case that on these 
views the prudential value of a child’s life is improved when she has a valuable relationship with 
someone or something, even if it fails to make her happy or pleased or fails to resonate with her 
more broadly. For some, it is hard to accept that something might make one better off despite 
that fact that it fails to resonate with one.
Those moved by this worry (and/or some of the worries plaguing hedonism) might find 
hybrid theories of children’s well-being more promising. Children’s well-being on such views 
consists in the having of some subjective attitude/experience in the possession of items like 
those found on the above objective lists.
Richard Kraut defends what he calls developmentalism: what is non-instrumentally good 
for a child is to take pleasure in the development or exercise or maturation of her “cognitive, 
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Children and well-being
affective, sensory, and social powers (no less than physical powers)” (Kraut 2007: 137). This is a 
hybrid view of well-being: to fare well, a child must experience pleasure or enjoyment in the 
exercise or development of various powers (Kraut 2007: 130). 
It is not clear that Kraut overcomes the worry targeting objective-list views. He rejects 
views stating that the development of a power in the absence of pleasure is good for one (Kraut 
2007: 128). Presumably he has the above worry in mind. But it is not clear that by adding that 
one must take pleasure in the development of a power for it to be good for one he avoids the 
worry. This follows from the fact that it seems that pleasure, as Kraut conceives it, is a sensation 
to which one may be indifferent. It is possible for one to feel the sensation of pleasure and for 
that pleasure not to resonate with one. If it is not good for one to exercise a capacity to which 
one is indifferent, it is not clear that by adding a conception of pleasure to which one may be 
indifferent one is made prudentially better off. 
If Kraut holds that when one possesses pleasure in the development or exercise of one’s physi-
cal, emotional, sensory, or cognitive capacities or powers, one fares well, and one may be indiffer-
ent to both, it is possible for the pleasurable development of one’s powers to be good for a child 
even though she is indifferent to it. In this sense, Kraut’s view is similar to an objective-list view.
A hybrid view that may avoid this problem states that children’s well-being consists in sat-
isfaction or happiness in intellectual activity, valuable relationships, and play (of various sorts) 
(Skelton 2015). This view might be better at avoiding the worry expressed above, for, on this 
view, finding one’s conditions satisfying involves some kind of (even if implicit) positive endorse-
ment of the conditions of one’s life or part of it. It might be implausible that very small children 
find the conditions of their life satisfying in this sense (Lin 2017; cf. Skelton 2015, forthcoming). 
If so, another attitude may be needed. The variety of pleasure in Kraut’s view may be more 
appropriate. Perhaps this aspect of Kraut’s view makes sense for very young children. The right 
view, then, might be that in the early stages of life pleasure in intellectual activity, play, and so 
on, is what well-being consists in and that once a child’s perspective and judgmental capacities 
develop, satisfaction or happiness in intellectual activity, valuable relationships, and so on, is what 
well-being consists in. Such a view would not avoid the worry articulated above at the very 
early stages of life, but perhaps very early on in life this is less of an issue, for children may not at 
this point have a perspective or any judgmental capacities of any robust kind.
Hybrid views seem more plausible than objective-list views (for discussion, see Skelton 2016; 
Hooker 2015). They have the capacity to explain why it appears good for a child to have some 
of the things on the above objective lists. The version of the view defended in Skelton (2015) 
may be the more plausible of the two; it appears well placed to explain the value of the develop-
ment of the powers Kraut mentions: developing these powers typically conduces to finding sat-
isfaction in meaningful relationships, various forms of play, and intellectual activity. It is unclear 
why emotional or physical development would matter if they did not conduce to satisfaction 
in such items (or those like them). Moreover, Kraut is interested not just in pleasurable devel-
opment, but healthy pleasurable development (Kraut 2007: 202, 135). The items on the list in 
Skelton (2015) provide a plausible account of healthy development (Skelton forthcoming).
A full defense of a hybrid view is not possible here (see Skelton 2015, 2016). Its proponents 
have to face up to an important worry: hybrid views say that to fare well a child needs to expe-
rience some subjective attitude in the possession of one of the items of the sort on the objective- 
list views discussed above (e.g., intellectual activity). If this is what well-being consists in, the 
hybrid theorist has to admit that when one experiences happiness in the absence of the items 
(unalloyed joy in the warmth of the sun on one’s face) or when one has one of the items (play) 
without satisfaction, one is not made prudentially better off. For some, this is hard to believe. 
Surely, it is good for a child to have a very robust, stimulating relationship with her teacher even 
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if she takes no happiness in it. It might not be as prudentially good for her as it would be were 
she to find happiness in it, but it is hard to think that it has no prudential value at all.
In reply, the proponent of this view might grant that the hybrid view provides an account of 
the highest well-being, but that the parts of the hybrid might contribute some, small amount of 
prudential good to one’s life. The difficulty with this concession is that it then becomes harder 
to see the difference between this view and objective-list views. Objective-list views do not have 
to hold that all items on the list have the same prudential value.
It may in the end be the case that objective-list views are the most promising ones for chil-
dren. All seem to agree that children’s well-being has an objective component and most thinking 
about it think an objective-list view is the right view of children’s well-being. Perhaps in the case 
of children, worries about resonation are not compelling. The main dispute seems to be over 
what belongs on the objective list. It is very hard to establish this definitively. Fortunately, this 
may not matter much for practice, as there is likely significant overlap in what the various views 
recommend as objects of pursuit. The narrowest of the lists, hedonism, tends to recommend in 
practice the very same things that the objective and hybrid theory lists recommend, e.g., valua-
ble relationships, intellectual activity, play, etc.
Rather than adjudicate this dispute, the next section examines a worry for all views so far 
discussed. All suggest that when a child has a surplus of what they hold well-being consists in, a 
child is faring well – that, on balance, her life is going well for her. This is open to doubt.
Pity the children?
Sarah Hannan (2018) challenges this claim. She argues that children’s lives are, on balance, bad for 
them. She argues as follows. First, some think there are certain prudential goods that are uniquely 
and/or exclusively good for children or to which they have privileged access. The possession of 
these makes children’s lives go well. These comprise sexual innocence, an ability to enter easily 
into loving and trusting relationships, and carefreeness.9 Hannan argues that these items are not 
good for children, for when combined with ignorance, they have very bad outcomes. Sexual 
innocence construed as lack of information about sexual matters can leave children vulnerable 
to “sexual exploitation, sexual violence, and…unrequited sexual desire” (Hannan 2018: 15). It 
is better for children to have information about sexual matters to avoid these things or to note 
the dangers of (especially) sexual interference. Carefreeness leads to bad outcomes for children 
in the cases where they lack awareness of the consequences of certain actions. Things are likely 
to go poorly for a child if she is carefree about her studies without an understanding of the costs 
of being so. Similarly, being able to easily enter into loving and trusting relationships might leave 
children vulnerable, since, unlike most adults, “children are simply predisposed to this sort of 
affection, irrespective of whether it’s warranted or not” (Hannan 2018: 17).
Second, she argues that children’s lives are characterized by four non-instrumental evils. Chil-
dren lack the capacity to reason well instrumentally; it is difficult if not impossible for them to set 
and find the most efficient means to their ends. Children lack an established practical identity – 
that is, they lack a stable inventory of values determining what to do. Children’s lives are almost 
entirely dominated by others and frequently interfered with, often without explanation or justifi-
cation. Finally, children are extremely vulnerable; they cannot or find it difficult to meet their basic 
needs – this vulnerability is profound and asymmetric (Hannan 2018: 21ff.). Third, though certain 
things are non-instrumentally good for children, including play and exercises of imagination (Han-
nan 2018: 17–18, 25), the above evils outweigh the goods, for the evils are more severe than the 
goods are good (Hannan 2018: 13, 18–19, 22).
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Children and well-being
Ergo, fourth, children’s lives are, on balance, not good for them; childhood is, on balance, a 
“bad state for children to inhabit” (Hannan 2018: 22).
A defender of the idea that there are unique or exclusive prudential goods for children has 
two replies. First, she might doubt that Hannan’s argument establishes that these things are not 
non-instrumental “goods for children” at all. Even in cases where they are part of a state of 
affairs that is not, all things considered, good for a child, they might still possess some prudential 
value.10 Happiness taken in carefreeness might be good for a child even if is part of a state of 
affairs that is, on balance, bad for her. The pleasure involved in a bout of heavy drinking might 
be good for one despite the fact that the wickedly painful hangover makes it, on balance, a bad 
state of affairs. Second, she might argue that although there are cases in which certain goods that 
Hannan discusses are (non-instrumentally) bad for a child, it does not follow that such items are 
(non-instrumentally) bad in every case. There may be cases in which being sexually innocent or 
being carefree is part of a state of affairs that is, all things considered, good and that part of the 
goodness lies in the sexual innocence. It might be non-instrumentally good for a child, but only 
when part of certain wholes.
As noted, Brighouse and Swift accept the goods of sexual innocence and of carefreeness as 
part of the welfare interest in having an enjoyable childhood. They note that the way in which 
welfare interests are to be satisfied is “sensitive to context” (2014: 64). They may argue that sex-
ual innocence and carefreeness are non-instrumentally good only when they are part of a state 
of affairs that is, on balance, enjoyable and safe for a child. 
This is not the best reply to Hannan. It is better to grant that the items she attacks are not 
non-instrumentally good for children. One might think this hard to establish in any case. One 
might grant Hannan’s conclusion about goods she considers, but deny that this shows that chil-
dren’s lives are, on balance, bad for them, for there are other prudential goods.
Indeed, it is noteworthy that only one of the views of children’s well-being noted above 
accepts that the goods Hannan attacks are non-instrumentally good for children. And on this 
view it seems that they might well be dispensable if they turn out not to be part of the “freedom, 
support, and environmental conditions [that children need] to enjoy their childhood” (Brighouse 
and Swift: 2014: 64).11 It is possible to argue that one of the above views is right; provided that 
a child has a surplus of the goods it accepts, her life is going well. 
This will not do as a reply to Hannan. It appears not to matter to her which inventory of pru-
dential good one furnishes. Her view is that the prudential evils that she enumerates “outweigh 
whatever goods children might enjoy” (Hannan 2018: 22, cf. 25). Hannan’s claim is that if one 
accepts her theory of children’s ill fare, and her claim that the non-instrumental evils are more 
severe than any prudential goods children possess are good, then, even if one defends goods 
other than the ones she casts aside, children’s lives are, on balance, bad for them.
There are replies to this version of Hannan’s claim. One might argue that hers is a rather 
odd list of non-instrumental evils. A typical list comprises suffering, pain, loneliness, neglect, 
abuse (physical and emotional), dysfunctional relationships, deprivation, and things like that. The 
typical list does not include the evils Hannan enumerates. When one takes pity on the Syrian 
children whose lives have been marred by prolonged civil war, and one thinks of what makes 
their lives, on balance, bad (if they are), one thinks of the pain, the suffering, the unhappiness, the 
fact that they have no or very poor or emotionally and physically damaging relationships, that 
they have only trivial or no intellectual activities, that they have no or severely formed kinds of 
play, and so on. One does not think in addition that they are poorly off because they are rub-
bish instrumental reasoners or lack a practical identity or are dominated by their parents or that 
they are vulnerable. The presence of these do aggravate the situation, but more in the way that 
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a poorly functioning government or lack of social programs aggravates the situation. They are 
impediments to well-being or causes of ill-being.
Perhaps this involves a lack of imagination about the badness of these bads.12 I think not. 
Imagine the following. A child is playing a game in the warm sun with a close friend. His loving 
parents look on, periodically murmuring words of encouragement and support. All the while 
they are keenly attuned to his security needs. The child is carefree. He and his friend are playing 
a game they have concocted and have worked hard to finesse. They are happily immersed in it. 
They periodically break to express their excitement at the prospect of a visit from the Easter 
Bunny, punctuating it with conjectures respecting how he manages his deliveries. This child is 
(seemingly), on balance, faring well. Now suppose that the child’s life is full of activity of this 
sort. He is performing well at school, diligently working each week at homework, he shares 
jokes and trading cards with friends, he has strong connections with the members of his family, 
he has solid time for play, structured and unstructured, and so on.
It is hard not to admit that his life is going well, on balance, for him. True, he cannot reason 
as well as a typical adult. He cannot secure and prepare his lunch or his dinner. He cannot make 
money. He has fewer values from which to draw (though not none). He will be told when to go 
to school, when to return home, what sorts of things to eat, when to bathe and how aggressively 
to scrub, what to read and for how long, and so on. 
True, this might change our attitude, to some extent, about the prudential value of the child’s 
life, but surely not enough to drive us to the belief that the child’s life is, on balance, bad for 
him. Hannan’s evils certainly function as obstacles to well-being (and/or causes of ill-being). 
But, again, they appear more like a poor functioning government or poorly provisioned social 
programs or discovering there is no toilet paper when you’ve just finished on the loo. To the 
extent that they are neutralized they seem unable to outweigh a robust inventory of the goods 
suggested above.13 
Hannan has a reply: children who fare well “aren’t robustly secure because matters could eas-
ily have gone badly for them, and there’s nothing they could do to affect the outcome” (Hannan 
2018: 24, also 16). Hannan’s claim is that contingency of this sort is non-instrumentally bad for 
children. But this is hard to see. It is certainly a threat to well-being, and, thus, reason we have to 
be more concerned about children, but it is not obviously bad for children in itself and not bad 
enough to outweigh a solid inventory of non-instrumental goods. In any case, Hannan makes 
no attempt argue for the claim. It is open to reasonable doubt.
Hannan makes too little of the fact that children change a lot during childhood. Her view 
makes good sense for the beginning stages of life, especially infancy. It would not be entirely 
unreasonable to think that infant’s lives go quite poorly. They cry a lot, get diaper rash, and 
seem always to be in peril; they are highly dependent and vulnerable. They cannot reason 
instrumentally at all and have no values of any kind. However, as children age they become 
more proficient and more effective at setting and meeting their goals, they adopt a more robust 
inventory of values, they gain freedom and independence and some discretion over what to 
do, and they are less and less vulnerable. It is hard to believe given this improvement that it is 
always the case that children’s lives are bad for them, even on the assumption that the non- 
instrumental evils that Hannan discussed are seriously bad for children. These things might be 
bad, but it is hard to maintain that as children age the bads always outweigh the goods chil-
dren possess or experience, even on the assumption that they are more severe than the goods 
are beneficial.
One of Hannan’s central claims is the strong but undefended one that the evils that she pre-
sents outweigh whatever goods children are capable of. It is not clear why we ought to accept 
this. It is not clear why the evils that Hannan discusses are any worse than the evils listed above, 
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including unhappiness, poor or warped relationships, and so on, and it is not clear when one has 
a robust inventory of prudential goods that these goods cannot outweigh the evils (especially as 
children age and the evils become less acute). 
Suppose that Hannan’s challenge can be deflected. This does not help us decide which view 
of children’s well-being is the correct one. This will have to be determined elsewhere, by ref-
erence to a more general discussion not focused exclusively on children. Such a discussion will 
need to reference a view of ill fare and face up to Hannan’s challenge.
Conclusion
The focus of this chapter has been children’s well-being. The first section distinguished this 
focus from others with which it might be confused. The second section outlined some hurdles 
to articulating a position on children’s well-being. The third section discussed and evaluated 
various theories of children’s well-being. The fourth section investigated the claim that children 
possess characteristics essential to them that are non-instrumentally bad for them, and that these 
outweigh the goods that they might possess. A full discussion of the merits of the views of chil-
dren’s welfare discussed will have to wait for another occasion.14
Notes
 1 For what looks like this suggestion, see Gheaus (2015).
 2 David Wendler (2010: 136, 220–221), e.g., argues that children possess in addition to welfare interests, 
an interest in a good life story or good life narrative. Both active and passive contributions to valuable 
human achievements make a child’s life better by making the life story more compelling without 
making a child prudentially better off. 
 3 Kraut (2007), which is discussed in the next section, is a notable exception.
 4 This may not be true of adolescents.
 5 For other putative attractions, see Bradley (2009).
 6 A recent (perhaps the only) textbook on well-being (Fletcher 2016) fails even to note it. 
 7 This is true even if hedonism is one of the views, for it is an objective list view with one non-
instrumental prudential good on the list.
 8 Hedonism seems to face this worry, too.
 9 For the kind of view Hannan attacks, see Brighouse and Swift (2014).
10 Hannan seems to admit this possibility in discussing her list of prudential evils (2018: 20).
11 Italics in original.
12 Though even Hannan expresses some skepticism about the claim that lacking a practical identity is 
non-instrumentally bad for children (2018: 20). 
13 I assume that the views discussed above will in their own way endorse my conclusion about the 
boy’s life.
14 The author wishes to thank Lisa Forsberg and Anca Gheaus for helpful comments on previous versions 
of this chapter and the editors of this handbook for their patience and good judgement.
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